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Abstract 
 
This paper argues that besides firm’s internal factors, institutions may also 
affect a firm’s participation in the production network. By analyzing the 
effect of access to credit, import license, and competition from the informal 
sector, this study attempts to provide an empirical study about institutions 
and firms’ participation in the Global Production Network (GPN), study 
case in Indonesia. A logistic regression analysis shows that most variables 
are statistically significant, with some variations between larger firms and 
Small Medium Enterprises (SMEs). Access to credit, as an obstacle, 
negatively influences SMEs’ participation, implying that SMEs in Indonesia 
are still constrained by financial institutions. Meanwhile, an import license 
can be regarded as the most crucial factor for the larger companies and 
SMEs, implying that it provides firms with more access to resources that 
may benefit their competitiveness. On the other hand, the informal sector 
tends to more negatively affect the larger firms than the SMEs, suggesting 
that its impact occurs through a specific channel. The findings highlight the 
influence of institutions on a firm’s participation in the GPN and provide 
certain policy implications, i.e., financial development systems, signaling 
policies, simplifying procedures of granting import permits, and 
implementing a tax for the informal firms.  
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INTRODUCTION  
Globalization and international trade agreements result in fewer country 
barriers and fragmentation of production, allowing every country to boost its 
economy by engaging in the Global Production Network (GPN) and increasing its 
value-added in trade. The concept of GPN is based on the fragmentation theory 
proposed by Jones and Kierzkowski (1988) who argued that the production of 
goods can be spread to several countries and performed by several companies 
through production blocks and each company can specialize in one part of 
production based on the comparative advantage of its home country. Moreover, 
Baldwin (2016) stated that the combination of cheap resources and information, 
communication, and technology (ICT) might increase industrial competitiveness, 
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enabling developed countries to move several stages of their production to the 
emerging economies.  
However, the GPN comprises complex interactions with companies that 
are located across several countries and, thus, the role of an institution of a 
country becomes very important. According to North (1991), “Institutions are the 
humanly devised constraints that structure political, economic, and social 
interaction. They consist of both informal constraints (sanctions, taboos, customs, 
traditions, and codes of conduct) and formal rules (constitutions, laws, property 
rights)” (p.97).  This study not only suggests that institutions play a role in 
determining various elements such as the economy, but it also highlights the 
importance of institutions—an aspect that might attract many scholars to analyze 
the relationship between institutions and economic development. According to 
Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2004), institutions play an important role in 
facilitating economic development. Empirically, property right institutions affect 
long-run economic growth, investment, and financial development (Acemoglu & 
Johnson, 2005). Similarly, Dollar and Kraay (2003) stated that countries that are 
more developed have relatively better institutions and trading performance. 
Levchenko (2007) discovered that the distinction between institutions across 
countries affects a country’s trade flows. In the manufacturing sector, Méon and 
Sekkat (2008) found that the quality of institutions is positively associated with 
the export ratio of this sector, particularly, an improvement in the quality of the 
regulatory framework. All these studies suggest that to improve the economy of a 
country, the government needs to provide a better quality of institutions.  
 
Table 1. Ease of Doing Business Ranking 2011–2016 
Economy 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
Singapore 
1 1 1 1 1 1 
Malaysia  
23 18 12 6 18 18 
Thailand  
16 17 18 18 26 49 
Vietnam 
90 98 99 99 78 90 
Indonesia 
126 129 128 120 114 109 
Philippines  
134 136 138 108 95 103 
Source:  Author’s compilation using data from Doing Business 2012, Doing Business 
2013, Doing Business 2014, Doing Business 2015, and Doing Business 2016 of The 
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/The World Bank, 2019. 
 
The quality of institutions of a country may be indicated by a ranking of 
ease of doing business provided by the World Bank in Table 1. According to this 
ranking, from 2011 to 2016, Indonesia was left behind compared to other 
Southeast-Asian countries. Indonesia ranked 126th in 2011 and 129th in 2012 
before rising to 128th in 2013; Indonesia was ranked below Singapore, Malaysia, 
Thailand, and Vietnam. After that, although Indonesia’s ranking from 2014 to 
2016 gradually improved, its position in the Southeast-Asian region has been 
displaced by the Philippines. Thus, Indonesia was ranked sixth during this period. 
This ranking suggests that Indonesia needs to improve the quality of its 
institutions to provide a favorable business environment for companies. 
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Furthermore, this ranking implies that firms may still encounter many difficulties 
while conducting business in Indonesia—difficulties that may inhibit the firms 
from producing a higher value-added product for the country.  
Figure 1 shows a fluctuation in the growth of domestic value-added 
productions in Indonesia from 2006 to 2016. The growth declined from 20% to 
0% between 2006 and 2016. The most significant decline occurred after the global 
financial crisis where the growth of domestic value-added decreased negatively by 
up to 10% in 2009 before it began to rise. On the other hand, the highest growth 
was recorded in 2010, reaching a peak of 35%. Nevertheless, it dropped 
substantially from 2011 to 2015 before it reversed its course in 2016. Although 
other countries experienced the same condition, the figure illustrates that 
Indonesia has undergone significant changes. These changes are not only 
influenced by international conditions, such as the financial crisis in 2008, but 
also by other factors, for example, the country’s condition and firm’s capability. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Growth of Domestic Value-Added Content of Gross Exports. 
Source: Author’s calculation using data from Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
and Development (OECD), 2019. 
With respect to a firm-level analysis of production network participation 
in Southeast-Asian countries, including Indonesia, many studies only focus on a 
firm’s characteristics (Harvie, Narjoko, & Oum, 2010; Rasiah, Roesli, & 
Sanjivee, 2010; Wignaraja, 2015; Arudchelvan & Wignaraja, 2015) based on the 
concept of firm heterogeneity proposed by Melitz (2003). Only a few studies aim 
to analyze institutions and firm’s participation (Dollar, Ge, & Yu, 2016, as cited 
in Dollar & Kidder, 2017). It should be noted that participation in a production 
network may not only be restricted by the internal factors of a firm such as the 
firm’s characteristics but also external factors, such as institutions of a country. 
Institutions are needed in the GPN because they may contribute to solving 
problems in the network and determining the competitiveness of a country. 
According to Dollar and Kidder (2017), goods that have complex value chains 
involve many exchanges between companies and might create a risk of contract 
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nonperformance from other firms; thus, better institutions, such as better 
enforcement of property rights and a rule of law, are needed to resolve this 
problem. Moreover, this paper argues that comparative advantage not on depends 
on increasing the productivity of a country, as explained by the Ricardian theory, 
but also on the role of institutions. Institutions might reduce or exacerbate 
distortions arising from asymmetrical information that may emerge in the 
production network. Furthermore, this paper highlights the role of financial 
institutions as a pivotal factor in deepening participation. This study suggests that 
institutions influence many aspects of production and, thus, it is necessary to 
improve the quality of institutions to resolve unfavorable situations that may arise 
in the production network. Therefore, institutions may determine participation in 
the network.  
Appropriate government policies to encourage a firm’s engagement in the 
GPN serve as an indicator of good institutions. According to Prete, Giovannetti, 
and Marvasi (2018), participation in the global value chain (GVC) depends on 
local conditions. These authors argued that a production network requires 
effective and efficient coordination among various production stages and, thus, 
favorable government policies aimed at facilitating finance and trade, establishing 
regulation, and improving infrastructure become important. In other words, these 
authors imply that proper governmental policies are essential in the production 
network. Similarly, Abonyi and Van Slyke (2010) argued that to provide effective 
policies, strengthening institutions should be a fundamental step in public 
administration reform. This study suggests that when institutions are well 
established, the government can create suitable policies to support firms in the 
production network. In summary, the aforementioned studies suggest that 
government support through several mechanisms is essential in the GPN, as this 
support promotes a firm’s participation in the production network, indicating the 
good quality of institutions in a country. However, if policies seem to hinder 
companies from conducting business, a firm may be reluctant to engage in the 
production network, indicating poor functioning of institutions. Therefore, 
institutions play a significant role in the GPN.   
Several studies have described access to credit as an indicator of the 
quality of financial institutions. In particular, countries with more advanced 
financial systems report lower funding barriers (Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, & 
Maksimovic, 2005). Furthermore, companies located in countries with better 
financial systems in terms of access to credit tend to export more than countries 
that face barriers to access to credit. Thus, the characteristics of financial 
institutions play a role in determining the trade value of a country (Goksel, 2012). 
This study suggests that when financial institutions are more developed, 
companies face fewer barriers to accessing credit. Additionally, more accessible 
credit increases a company’s export decisions, as the company may be better able 
to cover export costs.  
In the production network analysis, access to credit determines a firm’s 
decision to participate in a production network. Wignaraja (2015) provided 
evidence to suggest that the availability of access to credit positively affects a 
firm’s participation in a production network. Furthermore, he deduced that access 
to credit determines the sustainability of export in a production network. In line 
with this, Dollar et al. (2016, as cited in Dollar & Kidder, 2017) found that apart 
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from fewer government interventions, better contract enforcement and customs 
efficiency, more accessible credit increases the likelihood of companies to enter 
the GVC. However, firms may encounter various obstacles in accessing credit, 
which might affect their development. Examining financial constraints, Beck et al. 
(2005) found that these constraints inhibit a firm’s growth. Other studies 
discovered that credit constraints act as trade barriers, impeding a firm’s 
performance and resulting in low trade value (Goksel, 2012). Similarly, Manova 
(2012), as well as Minetti and Zhu (2011) showed that credit constraints act as an 
obstacle to export and negatively affect foreign sales, especially for high-tech 
industries firms and for industries that are very dependent on external finance 
(Minetti & Zhu, 2011). Moreover, Lu, Shi, Luo, and Liu (2018) found that 
financial constraints have a significant negative impact on the firm’s participation 
in a production network. These findings imply that access to credit can be 
regarded as a crucial issue, as limited access to credit may hinder a firm from 
procuring additional capital, thereby negatively affecting their involvement in the 
GPN. 
Beside financial institutions, other institutional aspect of this study is that 
trade facilitation which can be defined as various policies related to the movement 
of goods aimed at reducing transaction costs, especially in customs procedures. 
However, concerning procedures related to trade, obtaining import licenses is 
considered to be one of the most problematic issues in Indonesia (Damuri, 2006). 
This implies that trade procedures in Indonesia in terms of import license have not 
gone well, which may be attributed to inefficient procedures or the possibility of 
rent-seeking behavior. Similarly, Krueger (1990) argued that quantitative 
restrictions on import licenses tend to result in more rent-seeking behavior. Better 
trade facilitation may be achieved by reducing transaction costs, which can be 
accomplished by implementing efficient and effective procedures, particularly in 
the process of obtaining an import license. Moreover, better trade facilitation may 
reflect better quality of institutions.  
Several studies have emphasized that imported input of production is vital 
for a firm’s performance. First, Dick (1994) discovered that import protection by 
the U.S. cannot drive domestic output, leading to inefficiency in a firm’s scale and 
deterrence in export market share. Additionally, Muûls and Pisu (2009) found that 
a firm’s productivity increases with an increase in the number of imported 
products. Furthermore, Bhaduri and Ray (2004) showed that a more considerable 
imported raw materials affects the export performance of the pharmaceutical 
industry in India. They argued that access to imported raw materials helps the 
industry become more competitive both in terms of price and quality. These 
studies suggest that providing access to imported materials is not only essential to 
stimulate a firm’s productivity but also to promote export performances. Import 
licenses as a means of trade facilitation (Damuri, 2006) may provide alternative 
resources to a firm in terms of input of production. It allows a firm to have more 
access to various resources, comprising cheap raw materials or even high-quality 
input production, which may increase the competitiveness of local firms. Thus, an 
import license may positively determine GPN participation. 
There is growing literature with respect to the analysis of institutions and 
informality. Dell’Anno (2009) examined the informal sector by associating it with 
inadequate rules of law and lack of regulation. However, Johnson, Kaufmann, and 
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Zoido-Lobatón (1998) discovered that excessive regulations result in an increase 
in informal sectors, as more regulations entail more political control by the elite, 
leading to regulatory discretion. They found that bureaucratic quality, the way 
regulations are implemented, is significantly correlated to this unofficial 
economy. Specifically, Johnson et al. (1998) showed that a higher bureaucratic 
quality reduces the share of informal sectors. Moreover, a stronger rule of law, a 
better legal system, and more security of property right lower informality while 
corruption increases this informal sector. This study illustrates that institutional 
quality is more important than the quantity of regulation, as the quality of 
institutions reflects how formal rules are enforced. Good-quality institutions are 
indicated by effective and efficient enforcement of rules. Low-quality institutions, 
on the other hand, lead to several problems, for example, in this case, an informal 
sector. 
In the parasitic view of informality, informal sectors may adversely affect 
the formal one. These effects are not necessarily related to an increase in 
competition; they can be influenced by other mechanisms as well. Farell (2004) 
argued that the widespread informal sector not only impedes economic growth but 
also results in reduced government tax revenue, which indirectly leads to an 
increase in tax in the formal sector. Moreover, informal firms may have an 
adverse selection effect on the formal one in terms of accessing credit from 
financial institutions. Distinguin, Rugemintwari, and Tacneng (2016) showed that 
SMEs that face competition from informal sectors are more likely to be affected 
by credit constraints, particularly, the smaller firms, as they have similar 
characteristics as the informal sector. Furthermore, informal competition may 
negatively affect a formal firm’s innovation due to the possibility of being 
imitated (Mendi & Costamagna, 2017; Pérez et al., 2018). Based on these studies, 
it seems that the impact of competition from the informal sector works via several 
channels, which may negatively influence a firm’s participation in the GPN. 
For a comprehensive analysis, this study uses various characteristics of a 
firm as a variable control to analyze a firm’s participation in the GPN. First, firm 
age can be regarded as a fundamental factor in analyzing a firm’s behavior; this 
factor is employed by several scholars to assess trade (Andersson, Gabrielsson, & 
Wictor, 2009; Baldauf, Cravens, & Wagner, 2000; Javalgi, White, & Lee, 2000; 
Van Dijk, 2002) and production network (Wignaraja, 2015). Second, firm size is 
used to determine the probability of export (Javalgi et al., 2000; Wagner, 2001; 
Van Dijk, 2002), export sales (Baldauf et al., 2000; Minetti & Zhu, 2011), export 
intensity (Baldauf et al., 2000; Majocchi, Bacchiocchi, & Mayrhofer, 2005; 
Wagner, 2001), and the likelihood of participation in a production network 
(Arudchelvan & Wignaraja, 2015; Harvie et al., 2010; Rasiah et al., 2010; 
Wignaraja, 2015). Third, foreign ownership influences a firm’s success in 
exporting activity (Bhaduri & Ray, 2004; Van Dijk, 2002) and encourages local 
firms to participate in the production network (Harvie et al., 2010; Wignaraja, 
2015). Lastly, human capital may influence a firm’s productivity (Haltiwanger, 
Lane, & Spletzer, 1999), firm’s decision to export (Van Djik, 2002), firm’s 
participation in the production network (Wignaraja, 2015), as well as export sales 
(Minetti & Zhu, 2011).  
Other factors that are used in this study to analyze a firm’s participation in 
the GPN have been listed as follows: international quality certification (IQC), 
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foreign technology license, and innovation, which represent technological 
capabilities. Some studies have found that IQC not only affects export 
participation but also the export scale (Goedhuys & Sleuwaegen, 2013). 
Furthermore, it increases productivity and sales performance via efficiency gains 
and quality signaling (Goedhuys & Sleuwaegen, 2013); therefore, it might 
increase the probability of the firm to participate in the production network 
(Wignaraja, 2015). For the foreign technology license factor, several studies have 
found that it affects a firm’s participation in the production network (Arudchelvan 
& Wignaraja, 2015; Wignaraja, 2015). Innovation, on the other hand, is closely 
associated with export activity; for example, the likelihood to export (Wakelin, 
1998), export sales (Singh, 2009), and export intensity (Pla-Barber, & Alegre, 
2007; D’Angelo, 2010) which might be caused by the increase in productivity 
(Coad, Segarra, & Teruel, 2016). In the production network, Harvie et al. (2010) 
found that both process and product innovation efforts are important factors in 
determining a firm’s participation and upgrading position. 
 
METHOD  
Similar to the studies of Wignaraja (2015) and Dollar et al. (2016, as cited 
in Dollar & Kidder, 2017), the data for this study is also obtained from the World 
Bank, specifically from the Enterprises Surveys (ES). The objective of the surveys 
is to collect data about firms’ experiences in the private sector. Besides, the World 
Bank has promoted the improvement of the business environment as the primary 
strategy for development. Thus, the surveys are a project in gathering both data on 
companies' experiences and their perceptions about the business environment. 
This study applies cross-sectional data and uses recently collected data from the 
2015 Indonesia Enterprise Survey, which examined a total of 1,320 firms. These 
firms can be classified into three industries, namely, manufacturing, retail, and 
other services. However, this study only focuses on manufacturing firms in 
Indonesia. After excluding the retail and other services’ industries, the total 
number of manufacturing firms about which data is available becomes 1,074, 
comprising 356 large firms and 718 SMEs. 
There are several measurements to define production network 
participation. Wignaraja (2015) used a probit model and classified supply chain 
participation in terms of whether a firm exports its product directly and/or 
indirectly. Dollar et al. (2016, as cited in Dollar & Kidder, 2017), however, used a 
multinomial logit model for their study; this model consists of four categories: 
firm uses domestic input for the domestic market, the firm uses domestic input for 
export, the firm uses foreign input for domestic consumption, and the firm uses 
foreign input for exporting activity. Harvie et al. (2010) defined production 
network participation as a firm’s involvement as a supplier or subcontractor, 
importing intermediate input, or exporting some of its products. The ES World 
Bank provided information about a firm’s sales destination, namely, national 
sales, direct export, indirect export, or sales to a third party. According to 
Wignaraja (2015), the indirect sale is an indicator of a firm acting as a supplier, 
and he used direct and indirect export as the indicator of firm’s participation in the 
production network. This study follows the same approach by Wignaraja (2015) 
to measure production network participation. In other words, GPN participation 
will be determined depending on whether a firm export directly and/or indirectly.  
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This study analyzes the probability of firms to participate in the GPN as 
the dependent variable. For this purpose, it uses a binary model, considering the 
value of 1 if a firm is found to participate in the GPN or 0 if not. According to 
Bewick, Cheek, and Ball (2005), logistic regression well accompanies a binary 
model with one or more explanatory variables which can be continuous or 
categorical. Therefore, this study will employ a quantitative method using logistic 
regression analysis.  
Three variables represent institutional aspects, namely, access to credit, 
import license, and competitors from the informal sector. This study uses a 
dummy variable for import license while a firm’s perceptions are used to measure 
access to credit and competition from the informal sector. Based on the ES, the 
perceptions about access to credit and practices of competitors from the informal 
sector are measured using a five-point Likert scale with values between 0 and 4, 
with 0 indicating no obstacles, 1 a minor obstacle, 2 a moderate obstacle, 3 a 
major obstacle, and 4 denoting a very severe obstacle.  
Apart from analyzing an institution’s variables, this study employs several 
variables from Wignaraja’s (2015) study, namely, firm age, firm size, foreign 
ownership, human capital, and technological capabilities, which are indicated by 
IQC and a technology license from a foreign company. Furthermore, this study 
uses innovation as an additional variable to assess a firm’s technological 
capability. For foreign ownership, this study uses a percentage value to reflect the 
degree of ownership. The regression is estimated as follows: 
 
𝐺𝑃𝑁𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑖 = 𝛼0 + 𝛽1𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑜𝐶𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝐿𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑖 +
𝛽3𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑠𝑓𝑟𝑜𝑚𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑖 + 𝛽4𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽5𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖 +
𝛽6𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑂𝑛𝑤𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝𝑖 + 𝛽7𝐻𝑢𝑚𝑎𝑛 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑖 + 𝛽8𝐼𝑄𝐶𝑖 +
𝛽9𝑇𝑒𝑐ℎ𝑛𝑜𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑦𝐿𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽10𝐼𝑛𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖 + +𝜀𝑖 ………………... (1) 
In the equation (1), 𝐺𝑃𝑁𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡 denotes GPN participation, which uses a 
binary value, taking 1 if the firm exports directly or indirectly (sells its product to 
a third party) and 0 if a firm is wholly domestically market-oriented (Wignaraja, 
2015). 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝑡𝑜 𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡 is measured by a firm’s perceptions and categorized 
from 0 to 4 where 0 indicates no obstacle, 1 a minor obstacle, 2 a moderate 
obstacle, 3 a major obstacle, and 4 a very severe obstacle. 𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑒 is 
indicated by a dummy variable, which is 1 if a firm applies to obtain an import 
license and 0 if not. 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑠𝑓𝑟𝑜𝑚𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟, pertaining to 
practices of competitors in the informal sector, is measured based on a firm’s 
perceptions and categorized from 0 to 4 where 0 indicates no obstacle, 1 a minor 
obstacle, 2 a moderate obstacle, 3 a major obstacle, and 4 a very severe obstacle. 
𝐴𝑔𝑒 is measured by the number of years a firm has been operating while 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒 is 
defined by the number of employees. 𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑛 𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝 is measured based on 
the percentage of a firm that is owned by private foreign individuals, companies 
or organizations. 𝐻𝑢𝑚𝑎𝑛 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 is represented by a dummy variable, which is 1 
if the average production worker has a high school education (more than 6 years 
of education) and 0 if otherwise. 𝐼𝑄𝐶 is denoted by a dummy variable, which is 1 
if the firm has IQC and 0 if otherwise. 𝑇𝑒𝑐ℎ𝑛𝑜𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑦 𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑒 is also represented by 
a dummy variable, which is 1 if the firm has a technology license and 0 if 
otherwise. 𝐼𝑛𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 is represented by a dummy variable, which is 1 if the firm 
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introduces new or significantly improved products and 0 if not, 𝜀 is for error term, 
and 𝑖 denotes a firm—1 for the first firm, and so on. 
  
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION  
Table 2 summarizes the statistics of the data after clearly defining and 
setting the variables. Data was collected about 1,074 companies, with SMEs 
comprising approximately 70% of the total. GPN participation is a binary 
variable, which is value 1 if the firm participates in the GPN and 0 if not. The 
mean value of this variable shows that SMEs tend to participate less in the GPN. 
The import license variable is measured by a dummy variable and indicates that 
SMEs are less likely to apply for an import license. The access to credit and 
competitors from the informal sector variables are measured using a five-point 
Likert scale, ranging from 0 to 4, with 0 indicating no obstacle and 4 a very severe 
obstacle. Meanwhile, the mean value of both variables shows that both SMEs and 
larger firms perceive access to credit and practices of competitors in the informal 
sector as a minor to a moderate obstacle. With respect to firm age, the youngest 
firm among both larger firms and SMEs was found to be two years old while the 
oldest firm among SMEs was found to be 95 years old, and the oldest firm among 
the larger firms was found to be 59 years old. For firm size, the smallest firm was 
found to be an SME with two employees while the biggest was found to be a 
larger firm with 7,000 employees. The measurements of foreign ownership varied 
from 0%, indicating the absence of foreign ownership, to 100%, indicating full 
foreign ownership; these measurements were applicable to both larger firms and 
SMEs. The average production worker in large firms and SMEs tends to have a 
high-school education with more than six years of education. Lastly, large firms 
are more likely to have an IQC and a technology license, and they are more likely 
to initiate innovation. 
 
Table 2. Summary of Statistics 
Variables Obs. Mean Std. 
Dev. 
Min. Max. 
Dependent Variable 
GPN Participation Total Firms 1,074 0.19181 0.39391 0 1 
 Large Firms 344 0.427326 0.495411 0 1 
 SMEs 730 0.080822 0.272748 0 1 
Institution Variables 
Access to Credit Total Firms 1,067 1.22118 1.24329 0 4 
 Large Firms 344 1.311047 1.297809 0 4 
 SMEs 723 1.178423 1.215085 0 4 
Import License Total Firms 1,071 0.08684 0.28172 0 1 
 Large Firms 343 0.247813 0.432374 0 1 
 SMEs 728 0.010989 0.104323 0 1 
Competitors from 
the informal sector 
Total Firms 
1,057 1.48439 1.22937 0 4 
 Large Firms 337 1.522255 1.258404 0 4 
 SMEs 720 1.466667 1.216026 0 4 
Control Variables 
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Firm’s Characteristics 
Age Total Firms 1,071 21.1074 11.1904 2 95 
 Large Firms 342 25.78655 11.41248 2 59 
 SMEs 729 18.91221 10.38916 2 95 
Size Total Firms 1,074 162.629 450.024 2 7000 
 Large Firms 344 448.7994 715.09 100 7000 
 SMEs 730 27.77671 25.26205 2 99 
Foreign Ownership Total Firms 1,074 4.82775 16.4572 0 100 
 Large Firms 344 12.11628 23.35212 0 100 
 SMEs 730 1.393151 10.25599 0 100 
Human Capital Total Firms 1,003 0.9332 0.2498 0 1 
 Large Firms 326 0.972393 0.164097 0 1 
 SMEs 677 0.914328 0.280086 0 1 
Technological Capabilities 
IQC Total Firms 1,066 0.22889 0.42032 0 1 
 Large Firms 341 0.557185 0.497449 0 1 
 SMEs 725 0.074483 0.262736 0 1 
Technology License Total Firms 1,051 0.27878 0.44861 0 1 
 Large Firms 340 0.511765 0.500598 0 1 
 SMEs 711 0.16737 0.373569 0 1 
Innovation Total Firms 1,068 0.12641 0.33246 0 1 
 Large Firms 338 0.204142 0.403671 0 1 
 SMEs 730 0.090411 0.286966 0 1 
 Source: Author’s calculation, 2019. 
 
Table 3 shows how GPN participation is influenced by several factors, 
such as institutions and other characteristics. The above table provides three 
results/observations for the total number of firms, large firms, and SMEs. In each 
scale of the firm, two results comprise a coefficient and an odds ratio. The 
coefficient shows the direction of the relationship between explanatory variables 
and the dependent variable, while the odds ratio explains the magnitude of this 
relationship.   
 
Table 2. GPN Participation 
 
Total Firms  Large Firms  SMEs  
 
Coef. Odds 
Ratio 
 Coef. Odds 
Ratio 
 Coef. Odds 
Ratio 
 
Access to 
credit -0.0445 0.9564 
 
0.1754 1.1917 
 
-0.3815 0.6828 
*** 
 (0.1056) (0.1010)  (0.1668) (0.1988)  (0.1464) 0.1000)  
Import 
license 2.3708 10.7064 
*** 
2.0488 7.7583 
*** 
2.9644 19.3833 
**** 
 (0.3499) (3.7461)  (0.3703) (2.8731)  (1.0073) (19.5243)  
Competitors 
from the 
informal -0.2502 0.7786 
** 
 -0.3504 0.7044 
** 
-0.1715 0.8424 
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sector 
 (0.1136) (0.0884)  (0.1726) (0.1216)  (0.1643) (0.1384)  
Age 0.0267 1.0270 *** 0.0049 1.0049  0.0375 1.0382 *** 
 
(0.0091) (0.0094)  (0.0129) (0.0129)  (0.0126) (0.0131)  
Size 0.0006 1.0006 ** 0.0003 1.0003  0.0132 1.0132 ** 
 
(0.0002) (0.0002)  (0.0002) (0.0002)  (0.0063) (0.0064)  
Foreign 
Ownership 1.1696 1.0238 
*** 
0.0197 1.0199 
*** 
0.0278 1.0282 
*** 
 
(0.2497) (0.0056)  (0.0067) (0.0068)  (0.0083) (0.0085)  
Human 
Capital 0.6804 5.0527 
** 
1.5380 4.6555 
 
1.7903 5.9912 
* 
 
(0.2411) (4.1647)  (1.5022) (6.9937)  (0.9164) (5.4905)  
IQC 0.0235 3.2209 *** 1.1144 3.0479 *** 0.1546 1.1672  
 
(0.0054) (0.8044)  (0.3272) (0.9972)  (0.5124) (0.5981)  
Technology 
License 1.6199 1.9747 
*** 
0.4859 1.6257 
 
0.8532 2.3472 
** 
 
(0.8243) (0.4760)  (0.2968) (0.4825)  (0.4124) (0.9680)  
Innovation 0.9406 2.5615 *** 1.1498 3.1576 *** 0.7573 2.1326  
 
(0.2954) (0.7567)  (0.3962) (1.2509)  (0.4794) (1.0224)  
Pseudo R2       0.3715 0.3151 0.1971 
Obs. 967 310 657 
Note: * p < .1; ** p < .05; *** p <. 01. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses.        
Source: Author’s Calculations. 
 
Surprisingly, access to credit as an obstacle appears to only negatively 
affect SMEs’ participation while in the total firm model, access to credit has no 
statistically significant impact on a firm’s participation, even though this 
coefficient corresponds to the hypothesis, and in the case of large firms, the 
coefficient is positive but not significant. The odds ratio shows that when a firm’s 
perception about access to credit as an obstacle increases, it indicates that the odds 
of engaging in the network will be 0.6828 times lower. A plausible reason is that 
exporting requires high costs and sufficient capital to cover entry and other trade 
costs (Manova, 2012). Meanwhile, limited access to credit may prevent SMEs 
from taking a loan to pay the costs and increase their capital to expand their 
business. Therefore, the probability of SMEs to participate in the GPN decreases. 
This result is consistent with that of previous studies’ where credit constraints act 
as trade barrier (Goksel, 2012) to export and reduce both a firm’s foreign sales 
and their likelihood to export (Manova, 2012; Minetti & Zhu, 2011). 
The findings of this study suggest that, unlike bigger companies that may 
have more resources, SMEs still perceive access to credit in Indonesia as a 
prominent constraint. A plausible reason is that SMEs are the most affected by 
financial constraints (Beck et al., 2005) and credit rationing (Minetti & Zhu, 
2011). Using 161 samples from three industry sectors (clothing and garment, parts 
and components of automobiles, and parts and components of electronics and 
machinery), Machmud and Huda (2011) showed that apart from insufficient 
collaterals and the lack of SMEs’ ability to make appropriate business plans for 
credit applications, high transaction costs and the perceptions of financial 
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institutions that SMEs are less capable of repaying the loans are the reason half of 
SMEs in Indonesia have no access to credit. This study suggests that barriers for 
SMEs in accessing credit are not only caused by the inability of SMEs to make 
themselves more bankable but also because of the tendency of financial 
institutions to be complicated. Beck et al. (2005), as well Dong and Men (2014) 
concluded that the development of financial systems, particularly the development 
of the banking sector, might improve the financing of SMEs and reduce financing 
obstacles and constraints encountered by them. Therefore, to support the firm’s 
participation in the GPN, financial development may be regarded as an essential 
step. 
An import license is positively associated with a firm’s participation in the 
GPN; thus, this result is consistent with the hypothesis. The odds of participating 
are 10.7064 times higher than a firm who does not apply for an import license. 
Moreover, the magnitude of the odds ratio is the highest among the other factors, 
indicating that import licenses may be the most crucial factor for both larger firms 
and SMEs. A plausible reason is that firms may realize that import licenses can 
allow them to access more resources and better-quality resources for the input of 
production. Furthermore, a better quality of input of production may produce a 
better product and increase the competitiveness of local firms (Bhaduri & Ray, 
2004); hence, their probability of participation increases. Another interesting 
finding is that SMEs tend to participate more than the larger firms, as seen from 
the magnitude of the odds ratio of SMEs, which is higher than that of the larger 
firms’. The reason may be related to the characteristics of SMEs. SMEs lack 
resources, given the high prices of limited resources in Indonesia, and they have a 
low ability to compete with large companies in purchasing these resources. 
Access to foreign input through import licenses may be an alternative for SMEs to 
obtain both cheaper and a higher quality of input production. 
The significant result obtained for the import license factor may drive 
government policy; for example, the results may aid in creating effective and 
efficient procedures in the process of granting import permits. Better procedures 
may encourage more firms to apply for an import license and stimulate them to be 
more involved in the production network. Moreover, simplifying procedures and 
making them more transparent can be regarded as a form of institutional reform, 
which may reduce transaction costs and eliminate the possibility of rent-seeking. 
According to North (1991), “institutions reduce transaction and production costs 
per exchange so that the potential gains from trade are realizable” (p. 98); 
therefore, to take more advantages in trade activity, implementing better 
institutions becomes necessary. 
Practices of competitors in the informal sectors reduce the probability of 
firms participating in the GPN; thus, this finding supports the hypothesis. The 
odds ratio shows that if a firm’s perception about practices of competition from 
the informal sector as an obstacle increase, their odds of participating in the 
network will be 0.7786 times lower. However, the results differ between large 
firms and SMEs. The coefficient is negative in both cases, but the impact of 
informal competition on participation in the GPN can only be observed among 
larger firms. This impact may arise through specific channels, as Farell (2004) 
stated; for example, an increase in tax rates for the formal sector. This effect may 
disadvantage the larger firms, especially the exporter firms because higher tax 
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means a higher cost. Therefore, their tendency to participate in the GPN 
decreases. On the other hand, in the SMEs’ model, informal competition cannot 
be regarded as the main obstacle because of its insignificant results. One plausible 
reason could be related to the characteristics of SMEs, which are relatively similar 
to that of the informal sectors’.  
Previous studies have shown that the informal sector is closely related to 
the quality of institutions (Dell’Anno, 2009; Johnson et al., 1998); thus, an 
improvement in institutions may reduce the effects of the informal sector. 
According to Distinguin et al. (2016), the impact of informal competition is less 
severe for firms operating in a country with a better quality of institutions. In a 
country that prevents corruption and has a better rule of law and business 
regulatory environment, a formal firm experiences less impact from the 
competition of the informal sector. Similarly, Johnson et al. (1998) showed that a 
higher quality of institutions drops the number of this sector. In contrast, 
Distinguin et al. (2016) stressed that the poor quality of institution increases the 
size of an informal economy due to an increase in costs and lower benefits for 
formal firms. Furthermore, Friedman, Johnson, Kaufmann, and Zoido-Lobaton 
(2000) stated that an increase in the informal sector leads to lower tax revenue, 
which affects the quality of public administration. These studies suggest the 
importance of quality improvement in institutions in creating either a favorable 
business environment for the a or a higher country revenue. Therefore, improving 
institutional quality is an important issue for policymakers.  
Older firms are more likely to engage in the GPN. This result is not 
consistent with the previous studies (Wignaraja, 2015; Lu et al., 2018). One 
possible explanation is that compared to newer firms, older firms may have 
dynamic capabilities (Sapienza, Autio, George, & Zahra, 2006), which enables 
them to adapt more to the environment of a foreign market. Moreover, the older 
firms were found to have a higher likelihood to survive (Evans, 1987). 
Nevertheless, the older companies that are inclined to participate in GPN only 
occurs in the case of SMEs. One plausible reason for older SMEs’ inclination to 
participate may be attributed to the fact that SMEs have several limitations: 
limited information about the overseas market and a lower level of capital. Dong 
and Men (2014) found that younger firms deal with severe financing obstacles 
while Fatoki and Asah (2011) discovered that older SMEs are more likely to be 
successful in applying for credit from banks which may be caused by a good 
reputation from maintaining a good record of past loans (Martinelli, 1997).  
Bigger size firms are more likely to participate in the GPN. These findings 
correspond to the hypothesis and previous studies where firm size was found to be 
positively associated with production network (Arudchelvan & Wignaraja, 2015; 
Harvie et al., 2010; Lu et al., 2018; Wignaraja, 2015). However, the results show 
that adding employees only increases the likelihood of SMEs’ participation. 
Larger SMEs may tend to be more resilient than the smaller one (Evans, 1987) 
and have easier access to credit (Beck et al., 2005; Fatoki & Asah, 2011), which 
increases their ability to be involved in the GPN.  
The percentage of a firm owned by foreign parties also affects the firm’s 
participation in the GPN; this is true for both larger firms and SMEs and 
consistent with the previous studies (Wignaraja, 2015; Harvie et al., 2010). The 
reason is that the entry of foreign investors may led to technology transfer, as 
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suggested by Wignaraja (2015), or information about foreign markets and 
distribution channels (Aitken, Hanson, & Harrison, 1997).  
Human capital is also an essential factor that influences the probability of 
the firm’s participation in the GPN. This finding is consistent with the hypothesis 
and the findings of Wignaraja (2015). However, the results show that human 
capital only affects SMEs. A possible reason is that compared to larger firms that 
may have more capital, SMEs tend to depend on their workers’ capability.  
Technological capabilities —the availability of IQC, technology license, 
and innovation, seem to be the essential factors that determine the firm’s 
participation in the GPN. These findings are consistent with the hypothesis and 
previous studies where having an IQC (Harvie et al., 2010; Wignaraja, 2015), a 
technology license (Wignaraja, 2015), and product innovation (Harvie et al., 
2010) was found to significantly affect company participation in production 
networks. A possible explanation is that technological capability may improve 
production efficiency which enables a firm to increase its export performance 
(Bhaduri & Ray, 2007). However, the impact of technological capabilities varies 
between larger firms and SMEs. IQC and product innovation seems to benefit the 
larger firms which indicate that large companies may more easily meet the quality 
standards and improve their products, given the number of resources and 
technology at their disposal. On the other hand, the technology license factor only 
affects SMEs’ involvement, suggesting that technology license from a foreign 
company may give more benefits for the smaller firms. 
 
CONCLUSION  
The GPN may provide every country the opportunity to participate in it 
and expand its economy through value-added creation. However, the GPN 
comprises complex interactions between companies that are located across several 
countries; thus, the role of a country’s institutions becomes very important. This 
paper argues that in addition to a firm’s characteristics and technological 
capability, institutions may also affect a firm’s participation in the production 
network. Specifically, this study analyzes the effect of access to credit, import 
license, and competition from the informal sector. These factors represent the 
following, respectively: financial institution, trade facilitation, and business 
environment.  
Based on the results, most variables of institutions were found to be 
statistically significant. Although there are some variations between the larger 
firms and SMEs, the findings highlight the importance of institutions for a firm’s 
participation in the GPN. First, access to credit is found to be the factor that 
influences SMEs’ participation, indicating that SMEs in Indonesia still perceive 
access to credit as an obstacle, which hampers their participation. Second, import 
license seems to be the most crucial factor that affects both the larger companies 
and SMEs’ participation. The findings of this study imply that trade facilitation in 
terms of providing access to imported materials is necessary to offer more 
resources and a higher quality of input of production. Moreover, a higher quality 
of input of production is essential to produce a higher quality of output; this, in 
turn, may increase the competitiveness of domestic firms (Bhaduri & Ray, 2004). 
The last point is that the informal sector seems to affect larger firms more than 
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SMEs. This impact may be indirect, as explained by Farell (2004); for example, 
the taxes for a formal firm may increase if the government has a revenue deficit.  
For the firm characteristics, there are also some distinctions between the 
larger firms and SMEs. First, older SMEs tend to participate in the GPN, which 
means that older firms may have more advantages than a younger company, for 
example, in accessing credit due to their reputation. Second, bigger firms or SMEs 
are more likely to participate in the GPN, suggesting that benefits are associated 
with firm size. For examples, they can access credit (Beck et al., 2005; Fatoki & 
Asah, 2011) or have a higher survival capability (Evans, 1987). For foreign 
ownership, both the larger firms and SMEs are affected by foreign ownership, 
implying that the presence of a foreign company may benefit local firms. Another 
difference between larger firms and SMEs is that the factor of human capital only 
influences SMEs. A possible reason is that SMEs, unlike larger firms that have 
more capital, may tend to depend more on labor capability; thus, human capital 
affects SMEs’ participation. Next, technological capability determines firm 
participation. Specifically, having an IQC and initiating product innovation 
increases the likelihood of larger firms’ participation while having a technology 
license influence the participation of SMEs. Technological capabilities increase a 
firm’s performances, thereby increasing their likelihood of participating in the 
GPN. 
The findings of this study have certain implications for policies that may 
be implemented by the government to encourage the participation of local 
companies in the GPN. First, apart from improving the ability of SMEs to manage 
financial administration such as bookkeeping, financial development systems in 
terms of favorably financing SMEs should be provided by financial institutions. 
To reduce asymmetrical information between SMEs and bank institutions, the 
government can create signaling policies through bookkeeping training 
certification or financial statement health certificates. Second, effective and 
efficient procedures should be established for granting import permits. 
Simplifying procedures and making them more transparent can be regarded as a 
form of trade institutional reform that aims to reduce transaction costs and 
eliminate the possibility of rent-seeking. In addition to a stronger rule of law and a 
better legal system, implementing a tax for informal firms and providing tax 
incentives to formal companies may prevent the growth of the informal sector and 
encourage the informal sector to formalize. However, higher taxes must only be 
applicable to informal companies that have a certain value of sales and assets. 
It should be noted that this study has several limitations. First, this study 
specifically focuses on Indonesia and, thus, the results of this study may not be 
applicable to other countries. Second, due to the small number of samples, the 
results of this study are based on regression conducted for all manufacturing 
sectors that may have different characteristics; therefore, when implementing the 
policies suggested in this study, they should be adjusted based on the 
characteristics of each industrial sector. Therefore, further research needs to 
specifically analyze some sectors based on very large data samples. 
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